The Strength of the Argument from Consent

In modern times, the religious Argument from Consent–the idea that since the overwhelming majority of people believe that atheistic-naturalism is false and that supernaturalism is true, that therefore supernaturalism is true (or at least rational to believe in)–is considered invalid and weak, and yet while this argument is, as stated, generally considered weak and invalid in today’s day and age, I wish to draw a parallel (with which I have personal experience)  which illustrates that not only is this type of argument very powerful, but that we use it often in daily life as well, and in the most serious of circumstances, for after all, consider that when the police go to assess a person for mental health issues in order to determine whether or not that person should be taken to a hospital for further care, it is precisely the idea of “common consent” that police often use to determine whether or not the person being assessed does indeed have mental health issues; indeed, if, for example, a potentially mentally ill person claims to hear or see something, the police use the common consent of themselves and other people to determine if what the potentially ill person claims to have seen and heard (or not seen or heard) is actually there (or not there), and if the person’s claims go against those of the common consent of the police and others, then the person is assessed as mentally ill and is apprehended and taken for further assessment…and so my point is that if the idea of “Arguing / Reasoning from Consent” can be valid enough in society for us to apprehend people against their will and force them into treatment, then reasoning from consent is arguably just as valid a tool to use to come to believe that atheistic-naturalism is false (or at least not rational to believe in).


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