The Impotence of the Issue of Evil in light of Everlasting Life

One of the things that I find many unbelievers fail to appreciate, especially when speaking of the so-called problem of evil, is both 1) the radical value / good that an everlasting life with God brings with it as well as 2) what the value of this morally good thing means for the issue of evil and for the issue of what God would permit to happen in the world so that even but one person received this everlasting good, and so to illustrate what I mean, I wish to use an absolutely extreme example, but one which will illustrate my point well:  for the sake of argument, consider a situation where God knows that a certain person will only come to freely accept the gift of everlasting life with God if and only if a trillion other people experience pain and suffering, but if those other trillion people do not experience this pain and suffering, then the one specific person will not freely embrace everlasting life with God, and so when placed in such a situation–and, of course, all other things being salvifically equal (meaning that no one, including the trillion people, will lose their salvation because of the suffering of this trillion people), then not only would God permit the suffering of a trillion people to eternally save the one, but He–I would argue–is actually morally obligated to do so given His loving nature, for given that the salvation and never-ending bliss / happiness of merely one soul is an essentially infinitely greater good than the finite suffering of any finite amount of people, then in light of this moral calculation, God would indeed not only have a morally justifiable reason to permit the suffering of these one trillion people to save one soul, but He should actually be morally praised for doing, and we should and would all do the same if we reflected on the matter thoroughly (and note that this reasoning is nothing more than an explanation of Jesus’ parable concerning the shepherd leaving the 99 non-lost sheep in order to save the one lost sheep); and yet, note that the matter gets even worse for the unbeliever, for not only would God be morally right and good to allow a trillion people to suffer to give salvation to the one–again, all other things being salvifically equal–but God would be justified doing so even if the person that was saved would not exist for hundreds, or thousands, or even millions of years after the trillion people suffered (perhaps, for example, the person reads about the past suffering of the trillion people and that is the only thing significant enough to make her hardened-heart call out to God for a sign and/or to begin the journey of even thinking about God and His potential existence), and so in light of these two points, then it becomes quite clear that there is literally no coherent or reasonable way for an unbeliever to ever claim that some evil or some instance of suffering is gratuitous, for there is no way for them to have any coherent or reasonable idea of the effects that that evil / suffering will have in the far future…and so, when all is said and done, it seems, at least to me, that in light of these ideas, the guts of the so-called problem of evil are ripped out, and there is not much force left to the argument on an intellectual or rational level (and lest you think this is just some form of abstract reasoning, I note that in my own life, my return to the Truth was caused entirely by the writings of arch-atheist Richard Dawkins, for it was only after reading his ‘God Delusion’ book that I realized that if the arguments for atheism were as weak and shallow as his, then I seriously needed to investigate the Christian side of the argument, and so, even in my own life, I can see an instance of God allowing an evil to occur (namely, Richard Dawkins’ writing on God) which would seem to have no connection to me, and yet lead me back to salvation).

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